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ABSTRACT
We analyze three different examples of economies with incomplete
financial markets, in the first model we consider a bond and a
convertible bond and a convertible bond, and in the second model
a stock and an American put option on the stock. Although there
is only one commodity and asset payoffs therefore do not depend
on spot prices, we derive robust non-existence of equilibria in
both cases. In the last example we consider American call options
with nominal striking prices. We show that in equilibrium the
assets can never span. The Arrow-Debreu allocation cannot be
implemented and the equilibrium in inefficient. This example is
also robust.

1 Introduction
The general equilibrium model with incomplete markets has been used to
analyze a variety of financial contracts: real assets such as stocks and com-
modity forward contracts, nominal assets such as bonds—and some types
of derivative assets, most notably European options. This paper investi-
gates the existence and efficiency of equilibrium for two kinds of assets which
have not yet been analyzed: Convertible bonds and American options. We
provide a robust example of non-existence of equilibrium for each of these
assets, even in a one-commodity economy. We also show that even if there
are potentially enough options (with nominal striking prices) to implement
the complete market equilibrium, efficient equilibria need not exist. Both of
these results are in sharp contrast to the results for other types of assets.
The literature on existence of equilibrium in incomplete markets is vast.
Although it has been shown that in models with purely financial assets com-
petitive equilibria always exist, 1 Hart (1974) shows that equilibria do not
always exist in models with real assets. However, Hart's example is not
robust with respect to perturbations of the endowments of the consumers;
Magill and Shafer (1985) show that if there are sufficient assets to potentially
span the market then equilibria exist for a generic economy. The equilibrium
allocations coincide with the equilibrium allocations of the complete Arrow-
Debreu Market. Duffie and Shafer (1985) show that generic existence also
holds if the market is effectively incomplete.
In these models the non-existence is caused by a discontinuity of the
excess demand function. This discontinuity is due to a change of the rank of
the payoff matrix at prices at which some of the assets become redundant.
The generic existence argument relies on the fact that with real assets the
full rank of the payoff matrix can be restored by small perturbations of the
endowments and of the asset structure.
1
see, for example, Duffie (1987), Werner (1985), and Cass (1984)
This insight does not apply to models with European options. Polemar-
chakis and Ku (1986) derive a robust non-existence example for an economy
with a European put and a European call option. Like Hart's example, the
Polemarchakis and Ku example depends on an economy in which there are
multiple commodities. It is crucial that the value of the option varies with
the relative value of prices on future spot markets: Geanakoplos and Pole-
marchakis (1986) show that if assets pay off in the same commodity bundle
in all states then equilibria always exist.
The first example in this paper involves a convertible bond, and the second
example involves an American put option. In contrast to Geanakoplos and
Polemarchakis, we derive robust non-existence of equilibria, even though both
examples are one-commodity economies.
In both examples, the single commodity also serves as a numeraire. The
assumption that there exists a numeraire commodity is essential for all exam-
ples of non-existence of equilibria with options. As Krasa and Werner (1989)
show, when European options have nominal striking prices, equilibria exist
generically.
The third example in this paper considers an economy with American
call options with a nominal striking price. 2 There are three time periods
and six states of nature. Given the structure of uncertainty there would
be enough assets to dynamically complete the market. If the options where
European options Krasa and Werner (1989) would show that we can in fact
implement the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. We show that this is not the
case for American options. The only equilibria which exist in our example
are equilibria where some of the options are redundant. The equilibrium
allocation cannot coincide with the equilibrium allocation of the complete
2This is again a one-commodity economy. Admittedly, it is odd to consider fiat money
in a one-commodity world, but it simplifies the analysis, and demonstrates that the resul-
tant inefficiency is fundamentally different from the inefficiency in the Hart example. The
example can be generalized to a multicommodity example.
Arrow-Debreu market and is therefore inefficient. Again this example is
robust.
Thus the result contrasts with earlier results by Ross (1976) and Mc-
Manus (1984) showing that it is always possible to complete the market if
there as many European options as there are states of nature. The differ-
ence arises because the assets we consider allow a consumer who is long to
decide between alternative payoffs before all the uncertainty of the model is
resolved. With convertible bonds and American options this conversion or
early exercise decision affects the actual span of the assets and therefore also
the state prices. The actual decision of the consumers in turn depends on
the price of the assets and consequently on the state prices which as we just
argued depend on the decisions of the consumers. With European options a
consumer who is long also makes a decision about exercising the option, but
the decision does not affect the span. This difference drives all three exam-
ples and therefore serves as a new source of non-existence and inefficiency of
competitive equilibria with incomplete financial markets.
2 Non-existence with convertible bonds
In the following section we give an example of a one-commodity economy
with a convertible bond in which there is no equilibrium. This non-existence
result is robust in the sense that small perturbations of the endowments
and of the asset structure do not lead to the existence of an equilibrium.
We proceed by showing this non-existence for a specific example and then
give the argument that non-existence also has to hold for slightly perturbed
economies by continuity.
There are two time periods t — 0,1. At t = 1 there are two states
of nature, denoted a, 6. The state of nature is not known at t = 0. There
is a single consumption commodity in each state of nature. There is no
consumption at t = 0; however there are two assets available for trade. The
first asset is a riskless bond which pays of 1 unit of account independent of
the state. The second asset is a convertible bond. A holder of a unit of the
convertible bond can, at his choice, turn his convertible bond into a unit of
the riskless bond or into a unit of risky asset. We assume a unit of risky asset
pays 1.9 units of the commodity in state a and in state 6.3 If the consumer
chooses the risky payment we say that he converts the bond. The decision
to convert the bond is made at t = 0. Agents are permitted to convert any
fraction of their convertible bond holdings.
There are two consumers /, J. The preferences of both consumers can
be described by the Cobb-Douglas utility function u(xa ,x 6 ) = xa Xb. Let
w 1 — (9, 11), and wJ = (11,9) be the initial endowment of the two consumers.
In the definition of a competitive equilibrium which we present below we
also have to incorporate the decision of the consumers regarding conversion.
Such a decision can only be made by an agent who is long in the convertible
bond. Agents who are short have to expect a ratio of conversion which has
to equal to true rate of conversion in equilibrium. We denote this expected
rate by f
,
and the rate of conversion chosen by the agent i who is long by r\
We introduce the following notation: Let 9* be the portfolio choice of
consumer z, an element of R2 . The first component denotes holdings of
the riskless bond and the second component denotes holdings of the con-
vertible bond. (Negative numbers of course indicate short holdings). Let
+
= ((#i)
+
, (#2)
+
)> Le. we take the positive part of every component of 0.
In a similar way we define 9~ to be the negative part of 9 taken for every
component. Hence, 9 = 9+ + 0~. Let V(t) denote the payoff* matrix of all
3For the robustness of the result we allow perturbations of the convertible bond of the
following kind: The amount of bond the agent can get can be perturbed as well as the
risky payoffs. This basically excludes the possibility that the payment of the bond and of
the unconverted convertible bond are changed independent of each other.
assets given the conversion rate r. Hence
™-(I TV)-
An equilibrium is then a consumption-portfolio allocation (x\ 6 l ) € #5- x
i?2
,
i = /, J; a system of asset prices 7r £ i?2 , a total rate of conversion of
the bond f , and conversion decisions t* of the consumers satisfying:
(i) for every i, (x\ 6\ r') maximizes u'(:r) subject to the budget constraints
7T0 <0
x <w* + V(t)0+ + V(f)0";
x£Rl,eeR2,T£ [0,1]
(ii) £,w,j *' = E,=/,j ">', £,=/,j *' = 0, £ t=/,j7-«(^)+ = f E,=/.j(^) + .
The last equation is the requirement that the actual rate of conversion equals
the expected rate of conversion.
To prove that no competitive equilibrium exists for the economy we have
described, we proceed as follows:
We first assume that there exists an equilibrium where a part of the bond
is converted, i.e. where f ^ 0. In such a case the payoff matrix has full
rank and consequently the set of equilibrium allocations has to coincide with
the equilibrium allocations of the complete Arrow-Debreu economy. We then
show that in an Arrow Debreu equilibrium it is better for the agent who is
long in the convertible bond not to convert, i.e. to choose r* = 0. Therefore
this cannot be an equilibrium. Thus, if there exists an equilibrium then
the bond cannot be converted. The convertible bond is therefore redundant.
However, it turns out that if there were such an equilibrium, one of the agents
would be better of if he held a positive amount of bond converted into stock.
Hence this cannot be an equilibrium either.
We now show the first step. Clearly the only Arrow-Debreu equilibrium
allocation is given by x 1 = xJ = (10, 10) with equilibrium prices pa = pb = 1.
Hence, consumer / has to finance the net trade (1,-1). This requires holding
6 1 = — 1 units of bond,4 and 62 — |§ units of bond converted into stock. If
consumer / now decides not to convert then his net trade is given by (^, —).
Since
consumer / will not convert; hence the Arrow-Debreu allocation cannot be
an equilibrium (See figure la).
ft*.«*J
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Figure la Figure lb
Now assume that 0% of the bond is converted to stock. Since there
is no consumption at t = the equilibrium allocation has to be equal to
the initial endowments. Furthermore, no-arbitrage implies that the bond
and the convertible bond must have the same price. Hence the value of
a portfolio containing —1 unit of the bond and 1 unit of the convertible
Alternatively, the agent could hold unconverted convertible bond. Results are not
affected.
bond has to be zero. Suppose a consumer acquires such a portfolio and
decides to convert all the convertible bond. He can finance any net trade
of the form (0.9A, — A), where A > 0. At w 1 = (9,11) the marginal rate
of substitution is ~. Since ^ > 09 this imphes that there exists a A >
such that u 7 ((9, 11) + A(0.9, —1)) > u7 (9, 11). Hence consumer / is going to
convert bond into stock, and we have a contradiction to the assumption that
an equilibrium exists (See figure lb).
Since the preferences fulfill the gross substitution property the equilib-
rium allocation is a continuous function of the endowments and of the asset
structure. All the arguments still go through for slightly perturbed prices,
asset payoffs, and endowments. Therefore our non-existence example is ro-
bust.
3 Non-existence with American Options
In this section we give a robust example of non-existence of competitive
equilibria for an economy with an American put option. We prove this by
showing that in both cases, i.e. if the option is exercised in t = or in t = 1,
there would have to be an arbitrage. Hence an equilibrium cannot exist.
As before, there are two time periods t = 0,1, and two states of nature
a, b at t = 1. There is one consumption commodity in each state; however,
now there is also a single consumption good in period t = 0. At t = there
are two assets available for trade: a stock and an American put option on
the stock. The stock pays 1 unit of the commodity in state a and 2 units
in state b. The American option allows the holder to sell 1 unit of the stock
at a given price k. Our example assumes a striking price k — 3. The option
can be exercised in t = 0, or the decision to exercise can be delayed until
t = 1. If the option is exercised in t = then the payoff of one unit of the
option in the first period is A:, and and the payoff in the second period is — 1
in state a and —2 in state 6. If the decision is delayed, the payoff will be
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(k — 1)+ = max{A: — 1,0} in state a and (k — 2)+ = ma.x{k — 2,0} in state b.
As in the previous example we allow an agent to exercise any fraction
of his option holdings. The decision whether to exercise can only be made
by agents who are long. Agents who are short in the option have to form
expectations as to the percentage to be exercised in each period. Let f denote
this expected rate of early exercise by agents who are short, and let r* be the
percentage of the option portfolio which is exercised early by an agent who
is long.
Again, there are two consumers /, J. The preferences of both consumers
can be described by the Cobb- Douglas utility function i/(x ,x a ,Xk) = x x a xi,.
Let w 1 = (25,3,600), and wJ = (5,300,6) be the initial endowment of the
consumers.
The definition of an equilibrium of this model is similar to the definition of
section 2; we only have to chance the payoff matrix and allow for consumption
in period t = 0. Let x x = (x x ,x xaJ x
x
b ) denote agent i's consumption vector
and let X = (0\, 6 X2 ) denote his portfolio allocation. The first component of 6
l
is the holding of stock; the second component is the holding of options. As
in the previous section we define + and 0~ to be the vectors where we take
the positive (respectively negative) part of every component of 0. Given the
rate of early exercise r, the payoff matrix for this economy is
/0 kr \
V(t)= 1 -lr + (l-r)(Jb-l)+ .
\2 -2r + (1 - r)(k - 2) + )
An equilibrium is therefore a consumption-portfolio allocation (x\ l ) 6
Rz
+
x R2
,
i = /, J; a system of asset prices n £ R2 , a total rate of expected
early exercise f, and early exercise decisions r* of the consumers satisfying:
(i) for every i, (x 1
,
%
,
r') maximizes u x (x) subject to the budget constraints
x + 7T0 < w x' + Vo(f)0- + V (r x )9+
Xs < < + VM (f)0- + Va {r i )0+ ; s = a, 6
xeiJj, ^Ei?2
,
r* e [0,1]
(ii) £,=/,J *'' = £,=/,J w\ E,=r,j * = 0, £,=/,jr'(^)+ =fE,=uW) + .
where V5 (t) denotes the s th row of Va .
We now show the non-existence of equilibria in two steps. We first con-
sider the case where f < 1, so that not all of the option is exercised in
period t = 0. In this case, since the option is in the money in every state,
the assets span the market and the equilibrium allocations would have to be
the equilibrium allocations of the complete market. We now compute the
state prices associated with those equilibria and show that there exists an
arbitrage portfolio given those state prices.
Let p = (po,pa ,Pb) De the state prices in the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium.
Given the Cobb- Douglas utility functions, the demand 7* of consumer i in
the complete Arrow-Debreu market is given by
( pw
l pw x pw x \
1 iP0,Pa,Pb) =
3po 3pa 3pb J
By setting p = 1 and solving the system of excess demand equations we get
w l
a + w
J
a w
l
b + w
J
h
Hence, in our case, Pa = j§i and pi = ~. Clearly, pa and pb are exactly the
state prices for our economy. Therefore the price ir\ of the real asset has to
t>e Pa + 2/?6 = yjjy, and the price -k'2 of one unit of the option not exercised in
t = Ohas tobe(/:-l) +pa -f(A:-2) +p6 = 2pa +pb = ||. Iff is the percentage
of options being exercised in t = then ir2 = r(k — 7Ti) + (1 — t)tt2 . Consider
now a portfolio consisting of 1 unit of the option and 1 unit of the stock.
If the agent decides to exercise all of the option in t — then is payoff in
both states s — a, b is 0. However, in t = his payoff is k — 7r
x
— ir2 =
10
k — (rk + ( 1 — t)(7Ti+xJ) = (1 — t)(& — 7^ — tt'2 ). Therefore k — ir\ — 7r2 > for
every r < 1 which means that the portfolio is an arbitrage portfolio. Hence
there cannot exist an equilibrium where the two assets span the market. This
proves the first step.
In the second step we assume that all of the American option is exercised
in t = 0. Hence f = 1 and the asset payoff matrix V(r) is redundant.
Therefore all equilibria of the above economy would have to coincide with
the equilibria of an economy where the stock is the only asset available for
trade in t = 0. We now proceed by computing the equilibria.
Let m, n be the payoff of the stock in the states t = a, 6, and let p be the
price of the stock. With only the stock to trade consumer i solves
ma.x(w x — sp)(w x
a + sm)(wl + sn),
subject to the constraint that the consumption in every state is positive. The
first and second order conditions are necessary and sufficient for a maximum.
The first order condition is given by
—3mnps 2 + 2{w x mn — w xanp — w\mp)s + w
x
Qw
x
a
n
-f w
x w xbm — w
x
a
w\p = 0. (1)
The second order condition is
—%mnps + 2(u;Q77in — w xanp — w
x
brnp) < 0. (2)
Solving the quadratic equation (1) for 5 we get the demand function of con-
sumer i.
t
- w xQmn — w
x
anp — w
x
bmp
3mnp
+
(w lQmn - w\np - w xbmp) 2 w^wjn + w'owjm - w xawlp
\ (3mnp) 2 3mnp
(The second order condition guarantees that the solution with the positive
root is the unique maximum.) We now show that a x is a strictly decreasing
function.
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Denote the expression inside the radical by R. The derivative of demand
with respect to price is
dp 3P
2
1 \2wi
2p2 y/R 3
1
w lQmn — w
x
anp — wlmp\ WqW^u + w l w lbm
Zmnp J 3mn
2(wq) 2 w x w x
a
n + w x w\m
+ <0.
3p2 2p2 y/R [ 9p 9mn
In other words a1 and crJ are continuous, strictly decreasing functions for
p> 0.
We now compute the equilibrium price for the above economy. Inserting
the parameters in (3) we get
"'(?) =? - 101 +
3p
*
J
(p) =f " 101 +3p
\
/25 \
2
2525
-101 + 300,
Up
\
+
505
300.
Since the demand functions are strictly monotonic there can exist only one
equilibrium price. One can check that cr7 (5) = 1.027 and crJ (5) = —0.993;
whereas <7 7 (5.1) = 0.997 and crJ (b.l) = —1.003. Therefore the only possible
equilibrium price p lies between 5 and 5.1.
We now show that there exists an arbitrage also in this case. Since the
option is always exercised in t = the only possible equilibrium price for the
option is q = k — p. Otherwise there would immediately be an arbitrage since
the second period payoff of the stock and of the option are the same. Given
our choice of k and the equilibrium price p we have computed above, we get
q < 0. If an agent holds 1 unit of the American option and decides to exercise
it in t = 1 then his payoff is —q > in t = 0, and (k — 1) + , (k - 2) + > in
s = a, 6. Consequently the agent has an arbitrage. Therefore this cannot be
an equilibrium either.
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It now remains to show that this counterexample is robust with respect to
perturbations of the endowments and of the asset structure. The argument
is straightforward. Because of (1) both demand functions a* are continu-
ous, monotonic function of the endowments and of the payoffs of the assets.
Small perturbations of the parameters will only chance the equilibrium price
slightly. All inequalities which we need to establish the non-existence of
equilibria will therefore still be fulfilled. Hence our example is robust.
4 Inefficiency of Equilibria
In the previous example we assumed that the consumption commodity serves
at the same time as a numeraire. In this section we relax this assumption.
Specifically we consider a model in which there are American call options
with nominal striking prices.
In Krasa and Werner (1989) European options with nominal striking
prices are analyzed in an incomplete market framework. It is shown that
(a) equilibria exist generically, and that (b) the allocation of the complete
Arrow-Debreu market can be implemented if there are enough assets to span
the market. In the following example we are going to show that (b) breaks,
down for American options. Again this phenomenon is robust with respect
to perturbations of the asset structure.
The example works in a way similar to the previous one. We compute
the equilibrium of the complete Arrow-Debreu market and show that there
would always exist an arbitrage by exercising the option early. However, in
contrast to the example of section 2 we now have to determine whether such
an arbitrage exists for all possible price normalizations in the different states.
In the previous examples, by choosing sufficiently low absolute price levels in
the states s = a, 6 it will always be better to exercise the American put option
in t = 1. Hence the matrix of asset payoff has full rank and it is possible
to implement the Arrow-Debreu allocation. This argument applies to all
13
models with American put options with nominal striking prices. However,
as the following example shows it does not work for American call options in
a three-period economy.
We consider an economy with uncertainty described by six states of nature
S = {aa, ab, ac, 6a, 66, 6c}. There are three time periods t — 0,1,2. In
t = 1 a part of the uncertainty is resolved. Consumers receive the signal
a if s 6 {aa,a6,ac}; they receive the signal 6 if s € {6a, 66, 6c}, where 3 is
the underlying state of the economy. Uncertainty is fully resolved in t = 2.
There is one consumption commodity in each state and time period. There
are six agents 5 whose preferences are described by the utility function
u(x ,x1 (s) i x2(s)) = x Yl xi(s) Y[x 2 (s).
3=a,b a^S
Let w* denote the endowment of the consumers. As in the previous sections
we first give an example for a specific choice of parameters and then we argue
that our result is robust. We assume that all consumers have 2 units of the
commodity as initial endowment in t = and in each of the two states in
t = 1. Endowments only differ in t = 2. We assume that for each of the
states there exists a consumer who has an initial endowment of 7 units of
the commodity in this state, and an endowment of 1 unit otherwise. In this
example, the commodity does not serve as a numeraire; instead there is a
separate unit of account.
There are two assets available for trade in t = 0: a stock d and a European
call option e. The stock pays dividends only in t = 2; it pays 1 unit of
the commodity in s = a6, ac^ 66, 6c, and 2 units of the commodity in the
remaining states. The European call option6 traded in t = gives the holder
5We need at least six agents since the net trades of the agents in the complete Arrow-
Debreu market have to span the full market space. Otherwise the fact that the assets
cannot span does not prove that the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium cannot be implemented.
6Our inefficiency result would also work if the option where an American call option,
however, it is easier to describe the maximization problem of the consumers this way.
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the right to buy 1 unit of the the stock in t = 1 for the strike price k = 6
which is now measured in units of account. In t — 1 there are two American
call options available for trade. The options can be exercised in t = 1 or
t = 2. Assume that one of the American options has the striking prices
ki = 0.5, and that the other option has the striking price k2 = 0.4.
Given this asset structure, a portfolio plan of consumer i is given by the
vector
0* = (Oodi 0Oe,Qad, 0a\i0a2i0bdi Oblate),
where the first subscript denotes the date and state of purchase, and the
second subscript denotes the asset purchased. We will denote the vector of
assets purchased in one state by #3 , where s == 0,a,6. Furthermore we use
the notation 0+, and 6~ as in the previous sections to denote the positive
(respectively negative) part of every component of 6S . Given the rates of
early exercise r = (rj tS ), j = 1,2, s = a, 6 for the American option j in state
s. the matrix of payoffs of all assets traded in z = a, b is given by
( -hT\,z -k2T2tZ \
$Pza 2p2arli2 + (l-r1)2 )(2p2a -A:1 )+ 2p2a r2)2 + (1 - r2 , 2 )(2p2a - k2 ) +
Pzb PzbT\,z + (1 - Ti iZ )(pzb - ki)
+ PzbT2 ,z + (1 ~ T2
,
2 )(pzb ~ k2 )
+
\ Pzc PzcT\,z + (1 - T1>2 )(p2C - fcx)* Pzc^z + (1 - T2,z){Pzc ~ h)* )
where p2a , p2&, pzc is the price of the commodity in the states za, zb, zc. We
denote the first row of this matrix Vz (r, p), the second row V2a (r,p), the third
row K2t(r,p), and the fourth row Vzc (t, p). In other words, Vs (r, p) concisely
denotes the vector of asset payoffs in date 1 for s = a, b or in date 2 for s G S.
An equilibrium is then a consumption-portfolio allocation (x\ 9 l ) G R\ x
R8
,
i — 1,..., /; a system of asset prices x G R8 , total rates of expected
early exercise fj
<3 for option j in state s = a, 6, and early exercise decisions
Tj
s
of consumer i for option j in state s = a, 6 satisfying:
(i) for every i, (x*, 0', r') maximizes u'(x) subject to the budget constraints
Po^o + ^o^o < Po^o
15
p sx s + vs 9, < pawa + eodTTad + M*** - k) + + V5 (f ,p)0; + Vs (r\p)0+,
for 5 = a, 6
p5 z, < ps™, + V3 (f,p)6j + Va (r'',p) +^ , for s <E S
xeR9+ , eeR*, ^€[0,1]
(ii) £?=, * = £?=1 w\ Eti * = 0, Ef=1 r;J(^)+ = t-£?=1 (^)+, ^
s = a, 6 and j = 1,2.
If all options were European options we would immediately get the ex-
istence of an equilibrium from Krasa and Werner (1989). This also follows
from Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986): We only have to choose a price
normalization such that the payoff of the stock and of the options are linearly
independent and then use the fact that all assets pay in the same commod-
ity. This immediately proves the existence of an equilibrium where the assets
span the full market. We now show that with American Options the only
equilibria are inefficient.
In the equilibrium of the complete Arrow-Debreu market all consumers
have the same consumption plan: They have 2 units of the commodity inde-
pendent of t and s. The equilibrium price is p = Pi{ s ) = Pb{ s ) — 1- We now
show that this equilibrium cannot be implemented with the asset structure
we have assumed.
We can choose arbitrary price normalizations in every period. Let A ls ,
s = a, 6 be the price level in state 1. The state prices of states s = aa,ab,ac
is given by y*- and the state prices of states s = 6a, 66, be is given by y^.
Hence the price of the stock in t = 1 in state 5 = a, 6 is given by
O \ l >3 1 \ l < 3 l \ *- 5 A \
TT3d = 2A 2
,
3a T 1" <*2,a6 7 1" ^2,5cT = 4A liS .
^2,aa *2,sb *2,sc
In order to implement the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium the assets have to span
the full market space in both periods.
Consequently the call option has to be in-the-money at least in one of the
states. That means (7rad — k)+ > or (7rw — k)+ > 0. Given our choice of k
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this implies
Alf0 > 1.5 or A lf6 > 1.5. (4)
Without loss of generality we can assume that the first inequality holds. The
argument for the other case is similar.
In order to span the complete market at least a part (1 — fJt,) > of both
options would have to be exercised in t = 2. We now compute the price of
the options in t = 1 and show that there would have to exist an arbitrage by
exercising one of the options early.
The price qa of an option in s = a which is not exercised early is given by
9i = ALa
Hence the price of the option is given by f{-Kad — k{) + (1 — f)qa . In order to
implement the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium the options and the stock have to
span. This is only possible if there is a state in t = 2 where the options with
the striking price k l is out-of-the-money.
7 Hence we get
qi < 3Ai,„. (5)
We now show that a portfolio consisting of 1 unit of option 1 and —1 units
of the stock allows for an arbitrage if all of the option is exercised early.
In any of the states in t = 2 this portfolio has zero payoff. In s = a the
payoff is given by
m a = 7Tad - f(irad - kx ) - (1 - f)q\ - k = (1 - f)(irad - ki - q\). (6)
(4), (5) and (6) now imply
m« > (1 - f)(4A lia - 0.5 - 3A 1>a ) > (1 - f) > 0.
7At this point we clearly need that there are 2 call options on the real asset. If there
were only one call option then it could be in-the-money in all states and still span.
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Hence this is an arbitrage portfolio. Therefore there cannot exist an equilib-
rium which implements the complete market equilibrium. Again the example
is robust since the equilibrium prices of the complete market are a continuous
function of the endowment, and all the necessary inequalities still hold for
slightly perturbed asset structures and prices.
Finally we note that there exist inefficient equilibria. Consider the econ-
omy where no options are available for trade in t = and where two European
call options with the striking prices k\ and k% are traded in t = 1 instead of
the American options. Such an economy has an equilibrium because of Krasa
and Werner (1989) or Polemarchakis and Ku (1986) as we noted above. We
then have to choose sufficiently low prices levels A 1)2 such that in the original
economy the option traded in t = is always out of the money and such
that Taci — k — q\ < 0. Equation (6) then implies that it is never optimal to
exercise the American options in t = 1. Therefore we have an equilibrium for
the economy with the original asset structure which is, however, inefficient.
5 Conclusion
The models we have analyzed demonstrate that the properties of European
options in general equilibrium are quite special. Any financial instrument
which offers the possibility of early exercise, will carry with it the possibil-
ity for non-existence or inefficiency of equilibria, even in a single commod-
ity economy. We have demonstrated this by reference to American options
and convertible bonds, but we conjecture that the results will hold for most
derivative financial instruments.
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